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Tradition, tribe and state in Kenya:  
the Mijikenda Union, 1945-1980
1
 
In 1963 Bethwell Ogot, a young Kenyan historian, called for  politics to move beyond 
ethnicity and become truly national:  
The African masses have to be persuaded to transfer their loyalties from an 
association they know and understand – the tribe – to something impersonal, abstract 
and as yet non-existent, called the nation. 
2
 
 More than forty years later, in the wake of the terrifying and overtly ethnic violence which 
followed the elections of 2007,  Ogot, - who had in the intervening years became the 
country’s most prominent public intellectual - lamented  the continuing political power of 
tribalism in Kenyan public life.
3
  His sentiment captured a much wider sense of dismay at the 
persistence of the politics of ethnicity, in Kenya and across much of Africa. In the first 
decades after independence, when the explicit language of politics emphasised nation-
building,  the tribe posed an awkward challenge for academic analysis.
4
 Scholarship followed 
political rhetoric: the word ‘tribe’ fell from academic use, in favour of the allegedly more 
neutral  ‘ethnicity’, and in 1971 Archie Mafeje, a South African sociologist, looked forward 
to a history which would overcome the legacy of a colonial experience which had ‘helped 
create the things called “tribes”’ in Africa’.5 Professional historians always enjoy denouncing 
historical invention , and  multiple studies subsequently articulated a vision of flexible pre-
colonial ethnicities which were hardened by the experience of colonial rule and 
instrumentalized by missionaries, officials and literate ‘culture brokers’ – a transition 
summed up most cogently in John Lonsdale’s contrast between ‘moral ethnicity’ and 
‘political tribalism’.6   
                                                          
1
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Critiques of this literature which argued that it discounted African agency were perhaps 
overstated: some of it placed African ‘culture brokers’ very much at the centre of the 
process.
7
 A more significant weakness was a failure to explain what Crawford Young called 
‘the intense passions’ of ethnicity -  or, as John Peel put it, the need for ethnic identity to have 
a cultural basis which gives it force in everyday life.
8
 As Peter Ekeh pointed out, while 
tribalism was shunned by scholars, it continued to thrive in popular discourse.
9
 The force of 
that criticism has been underscored by repeated and sometimes horrifying demonstrations of 
the continued vitality of ethnic politics, over the last two decades:  ‘a brutal reminder’, in 
Carola Lentz’s words,  ‘that ethnicity cannot simply be explained away’.10 Faced with a 
powerful politics of belonging and autochthony,  academic work has turned steadily towards 
arguing the resilience of ‘African conceptions of political space’, seeking the roots of 
ethnicity in quotidian behaviours that generate the ‘habitual dispositions’ which underpin 
ethnic affinity,  and even emphasising the role of what Jonathon Glassman has called ‘modes 
of thought . . . inherited from precolonial traditions’; Paul Nugent’s work has demonstrated 
that the construction of ethnicities in West Africa stretches back well before the colonial 
period.
11
 Such reevaluations, like those of the 1970s, fit into wider scholarly trends – in this 
case, a tendency to emphasize long-term continuity in African political cultures, and to 
downplay the impact of what some would call ‘the colonial moment’ in Africa.12  
This paper, however, reasserts the significance of that moment through revisiting the history 
of one particular ethnicity in Kenya. Acknowledging the profound importance of cultural 
affect, and placing African agency at the centre of these processes, it nonetheless follows 
Gabrielle Lynch’s work in insisting on the importance of the final years of colonialism - a 
critical juncture’  characterised by very public, and often fierce, politics, when the state was 
at its most intrusive and well-resourced even as its future was thrust dramatically into 
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question by rapid political change.
13
 Ethnicity was not a novel feature of the colonial world, 
but the processes through which ethnicities were made and remade gained new force because 
of colonialism. While the ‘roots of contemporary identities’ may, as Nugent says, lie in the 
pre-colonial past, at least some of the efflorescent vigour of such identities is a result of more 
recent circumstances.
14
 In particular, it will be argued here that the final years of colonial rule 
saw the embedding of a powerful, productive, discursive contrast in quotidian experience as 
well as in political argument. 
Tom Spear , in a recent critical survey of the literature on colonial invention, has used the 
term ‘neo-traditionalism’- inspired by the political science notion of ‘neo-patrimonialism’ – 
to emphasise that  processes of innovation were always limited by culture,  possibilities 
always constrained by the need to evoke people’s lived experience. 15 In doing so, he has 
deployed the word ‘tradition’ in two rather different ways. On the one hand, it signifies a 
particular performance or pattern of language which is established and familiar in a society – 
‘a tradition’. It is the enduring influence of this kind of ‘tradition’ which Spear emphasises as 
a force limiting invention. On the other hand, he also refers to tradition as a discursive tool: 
that is, as a way of arguing about the character of practices.
16
 The story of the Mijikenda of 
Kenya’s coast, discussed below, suggests that while the first of Spear’s meanings was 
significant in setting the ‘limits of invention’, it is the second meaning which reveals quite 
how transformative the colonial experience was in creating new possibilities for cultural 
entrepreneurship,  legitimized by an idea of tradition which rested on its contrast with 
modernity.  
This dichotomy has proven powerfully productive, across Africa. As John Comaroff has 
suggested, colonial officials saw their role as ‘the practical management, often  the 
production of,  difference’ between the modern and the traditional; and the African officials 
who took over the levers of the state in the early 1960s at least partly shared this assumption, 
seeing themselves as representatives of a modern state, dealing with an often intractable 
population.
 17
 The contrast between tradition and the multiple manifestations of modernity 
was not only the work of officials, or teachers: the evocation of an alternative sphere of 
distinctive social relations, ruled by tradition, could also be a technique for those who sought 
to evade or subvert the demands of officials, or to assert their own authority. In constant 
implicit contrast to the ‘modern’, this too was a discursive tool used to ‘make political claims 
and envision different futures’.18 James Ferguson’s work on the Zambian Copperbelt and  
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Lynn Thomas’ study of  Kenya in the 1960s have each shown how these contrasts featured in 
popular moral debate.
19
 The evocation of this distinct sphere, conceived in explicit contrast to 
the modern,  may not always have allowed people to  ‘create[] a space that stood separate 
from the state’, as completely as James Giblin has suggested of the Tanzanian villagers 
whose stories he has recorded: the rural homestead existed in the same money economy as 
the urban labourer who migrated from it.
 20
 But it did provide a way to negotiate over 
individual and community authority. The idea of ethnicity explored in this paper drew on the 
productive power of this division between tradition and the multiple, modern, antitheses 
which colonialism created for it. What Ogot has called ‘the invention of greater ethnic 
communities’ which now play such a prominent role in Kenyan politics must be understood 
partly in terms of cultural continuity - but this in itself is not enough to explain why political 
innovation has taken particular ethnic forms, and why ethnicity has become such a significant 
‘category of practice’.21 That question is one which, as the events of 2008 showed, has lost 
none of its urgency since the 1960s.    
A brief history of failure? 
In November 1944 the Provincial Commissioner (PC) of Kenya’s Coast Province received a 
letter announcing the creation of the ‘Miji Kenda Union.’  
Please receive this letter informing you that we people of the nine tribes of the coast . 
. . have the intention of uniting our tribes and bringing back the KINSHIP which 
existed in the time of our forefathers, and creating a party of unity, in order to advance 
our nation through consultation, mutual affection and assistance in every way.
22
 
The authors were all men, waged employees living in the coastal town of Mombasa, or in the 
colonial capital, Nairobi. They evoked the  newly voguish colonial aim of development in 
support of their plans: ‘You must be aware of the rottenness and weakness of the 
development of these people, always being behind; it is because of being divided into small 
groups, and not agreeing in consultations.’  
The PC made no objection, and in a first flush of enthusiasm, the new Union organized a 
grand meeting in Rabai, a few miles inland from Mombasa, attended by men described as  
representatives of all the ‘nine tribes’: Digo, Duruma, and Giriama (the three groups which 
are largest in numerical terms) and the smaller groups of Rabai, Ribe, Kambe, Jibana, 
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Chonyi, and Kauma.
 23
 But by the end of the 1940s the Union had almost collapsed, 
undermined by a combination of poor management, official hostility and embezzlement; in 
subsequent decades it never achieved a sustained institutional existence, although the name 
‘Mijikenda Union’ was frequently appropriated by a range of groups and individuals. In 1980 
it was formally dissolved, as an incidental byproduct of the antipathy of  Daniel arap Moi,  
independent Kenya’s second president, for another ‘ethnic’ union, the Gikuyu, Embu and 
Meru Association (GEMA): all such associations were required to dissolve themselves, on 
the grounds that all Kenyans should be committed solely to a broader vision of ‘nation’.24  
This seems a poor record, and the Mijikenda Union has been seen in previous scholarship as 
no more than a brief stage on the route to nationalist politics.
25
 But despite its organizational 
failings, the Union had a lasting impact. In 1944, the term Mijikenda was an innovation. As 
the PC’s correspondents admitted, the ‘nine tribes’ whom they sought to represent had 
previously been more often regarded as several separate groups, or  – when they were given 
any collective identity at all, were  ‘better known by the term Wanyika’ - a  mildly pejorative 
term which implied that their proper place was in the ‘wilderness’, inland from the coastal 
settlements.
26
 Twenty years later the term Mijikenda had become entirely naturalized into the 
language of Kenya’s ethnic politics, was widely accepted as denoting a group whose 
members had a shared sense of identity and interests.  
Tradition and authority in the late colonial state 
The men who first used the term Mijikenda as an ethnonym did so in ways which reflected 
their profoundly colonial experience – conjuring the Union through letters, a constitution, and 
minutes of a meeting. But they also drew imaginatively on ‘tradition’: both in the sense of 
shared practice, and through the powerful contrast between the worlds of tradition and 
colonial government.  
A myth of origin through a shared migration from a northern homeland called Singwaya had 
come to link all of the nine tribes. This story, told by other coastal groups in the nineteenth 
century,  seems to have become widely  (though not universally) known amongst the nine 
tribes from the early twentieth century.
27
 Multiple circumstances contributed to the adoption 
of this story. There is a considerable linguistic continuum among this population; this can be 
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categorised into discrete languages, but the linguistic boundaries are hazy and there is 
substantial inter-comprehensibility. A long history of marriage and migration has spread 
words and names and practices, creating complex patterns of similarity and difference in 
terms of  language and culture which are not always readily mapped onto any single ethnic  
schema. Movements by individuals or families have also expanded the area occupied by this 
population over time – especially to the north of Mombasa.28 There,  the mid-nineteenth 
century concentration of population had been along and west of the chain of hills which lie 
some 15 miles inland of the coast, stretching up to Kilifi;  subsequent history has seen a 
steady and significant movement of population northwards, as well as eastwards towards the 
shoreline.
29
 This migration became mixed up with the widespread absorption into these 
communities of former slaves and their descendants, who fled from coastal plantations in the 
nineteenth century, or left them in the wake of the abolition of slavery in 1907.
30
    There was 
– and is -  also considerable similarity in notions of moral authority across this population, 
notably in the former importance of age-grades and in the continued role of central ritual 
spaces known as kayas, though the details of the age-grade system seem to have varied, as 
did the nature of each group’s relationship to the kayas .  
This is, in short, a population in which individuals are aware of multiple distinctive group 
identities, but have also been constantly faced with reminders of their commonality. Disputes 
over bridewealth, inheritance and other obligations, the inevitable product of such closeness,  
have  encouraged constant debate over morality and customary law, and the relationship of 
these to categories of identity, in which both similarity and difference have been rehearsed 
through arguments over – for example – the relative significance of maternal and paternal ties 
in relationships of claim and obligation. These were multiple, overlapping, moral ethnicities, 
whose members constantly debated the bounds of the shared assumptions which constituted 
their social bonds. 
The founding document of the Union offered this similarity in language and customs as 
evidence that the Mijikenda were ’one nation from their origin.’ And it placed this nation as 
the victims of dispossession:   
...when the Asian and European strangers came, they found these indigenous people 
… And these strangers, if they wanted anything or had any issue, they had to discuss 
this with the elders of the MIJI KENDA . . . this union had the authority to make or 
remove any law in their country . .. because of the avarice which was associated with 
these foreign tribes, which were not compatible with the people of MIJI KENDA, 
they caused them to fall out and fight, causing our elders to misunderstand one 
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another, and so it happened that the power and authority of those Mijikenda elders 
was lost.
31
   
The language and events at the meeting of the Mijikenda Union at Rabai in 1945 played 
repeatedly on this division between the culture of the indigenes and that of strangers.   
Opening the meeting, Edward Binns (then in his forties) explained that he and other ‘youths’ 
who worked in Nairobi had first conceived the Union as a response to their life as migrant 
workers: ‘there are not many Nyika youths in Nairobi, but they thought it better to create a 
party to unite our nine tribes ‘. For Binns, the cultural gap between indigenes and strangers: 
created opportunities for intermediacy: ‘it is up to [the elders] to lead us with all that they 
have which is of benefit and it is up to us youths to bring to them all the good things which 
we pick up in our education’ , he said, adding later that ‘we must help [chiefs and elders] and 
show them the modern way with good manners and respect.’ 
The meeting,  reportedly attended by a thousand people, including chiefs and ‘elders’, offered 
a theatrical demonstration of the different possibilities of such intermediacy.   Nine elders 
were selected to represent the nine tribes; they gave their approval to the Union ‘if you, our 
children, will sit with your elders respectfully’, but took the opportunity to explicitly define 
themselves as the kambi wa Mijikenda – ‘the  initiated elders of the Mijikenda’.32 It was a 
novel claim, cast as tradition, which drew both on existing notions of elderhood and on the 
powerful distinction between education and tradition. 
‘The youth’ of the Mijikenda Union had cause to be anxious about their relationship with 
elders and with tradition; for their own experience had been very much shaped by 
colonialism. The shifting cast of officers of the Mijikenda Union in the later 1940s included a 
number of educated Christian men,  the children or grandchildren of freed slaves from south-
east Africa, who had been settled at missionary stations.
33
 They were outsiders – marked as 
such by their lack of local kin and by their education, which gave them privileged access to 
clerical employment. Binns himself was one; so was William Paul, from whose postal 
address the first letter to the PC had been sent.
34
 There were other kinds of marginality, too: 
Nimrod Taabu, who also spoke up to ask the elders to pursue unity, was a Digo convert to 
Christianity, a rare thing among a group who were (unlike other putative Mijikenda) 
overwhelmingly Muslim. He spent much of his life in Nairobi, working as a carpenter; as did 
John Juma Maneno, another Digo convert to Christianity who became a Mijikenda Union 
official.
35
   If asked their identity, all these men could lay claim to membership of one or 
more of the nine tribes, a claim sometimes made on the basis of ties of marriage, sometimes 
simply through residence or friendship. Binns had grown up in Rabai, at the mission station, 
                                                          
31
 Foreword to the Rules of the Mijikenda Union, with Said Suleiman to PC Coast, 5 Nov. 1944, KNA OP 1/1331. 
This is my translation of the original Swahili; there is a variant English translation of the letter, foreword and 
rules, prepared by Kibwana bin Mza, in KNA CC 1/49. 
32
 Minutes, Miji Kenda Union General Meeting, 28/29
th
 Dec. 1945, KNA CC 1/49 
33
 Thomas Herlehy and R.F. Morton, ‘A coastal ex-slave community in the regional and colonial economy of 
Kenya: the Wamisheni of Rabai, 1880-1963’, in Suzanne Miers and Richard Roberts (eds), The End of Slavery in 
Africa (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988),  254-81. 
34
 Interviews, Lawrence Bennett, 4, 25 June 2010; Harry Ngonyo and Joshua Malingi, 11, 13 Jan. 2011. 
35
 Interview, Samuel Maneno, 4 Jan. 2011. 
8 
 
and had made blood brotherhood with a prominent Giriama family; Nimrod Taabu married a 
woman from another Mijikenda group, among whom Christianity was more acceptable . But 
in small communities, where people routinely place one another through a detailed 
knowledge of kinship and marriage relationships, the ambiguous status of such people was 
widely known.  
These men – and all were men – may seem rather like the sort of ‘lonely, bilingual 
intelligentsia’ who elsewhere were nationalists, inducted into a new sense of identity by the 
experience of government employment, and created as a community by their shared 
pilgrimages around the nation created by colonialism.
36
  But in this case they were exploring 
a much more closely circumscribed idea of the nation. Some of their fellow members  were 
also employees, but more local in their experience, and there were Muslims as well as 
Christians: Said Suleiman, who wrote to the PC, was a Muslim dock-worker; Ali bin Salim, 
another of the ‘youth’ who spoke up at Rabai, and head of the ‘Mombasa Branch’ of the 
Union, was a headman for Mombasa municipality; Lewis Simeon worked for the Public 
Works Department. For many of these men,  their hold on the world of money and 
employment was insecure, and the community they imagined was one which affirmed a place 
in local society, the possibility of retirement to a rural home secured through  their ties of 
kinship and marriage which spanned the sub-groups of what they now called the Mijikenda. 
Binns and his fellows referred with confidence to elders and tradition, and the audience 
echoed these terms with enthusiasm. But the chiefs and elders who crowded the Rabai 
meeting faced their own uncertainties. Popular memory among these communities has 
recalled a pre-colonial past in which authority was ‘gerontocratic’, diffused among the older 
men of each community through a system of age-sets, the rituals of which revolved around 
each community’s ritual spaces, the forest clearings known as the kayas.37 This is at least in 
part idealized, rather than historical;  there are counter-memories of multiple, competing, 
kayas and of individuals who claimed a wider power; and there is a persistent practice of 
esoteric power associated with secret societies to which men have gained access through 
purchase of knowledge, rather than through generational advance.
38
 Since the 1880s no 
complete cohort of men has gone through the full  rituals of age-set advancement. By 1914, 
these were already  only uncertainly remembered from an ever-more remote past.
39
 In these 
circumstances, the colonial state struggled to find local agents:  in the three districts of Kilifi, 
Kwale and Mombasa, into which the southern coast was divided for administrative purposes, 
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those selected by officials as headmen (after 1938, restyled as chiefs) were seen by officials 
as chronically lacking in authority.
40
  
If district commissioners were unsure who the ‘elders’ were, so were many of their subjects. 
Tensions between young men and old  had been generated by the expansion of settlement in 
previous decades, which gave young men opportunities to challenge or defy their elders. 
From the end of the nineteenth century, these tensions  gained new vigour, as opportunities 
grew for waged work, or for marketing produce,  in the town of Mombasa and elsewhere on 
the coast. Older men complained of the indiscipline of a younger generation, but they were 
themselves divided, with individuals frequently in dispute over land, or livestock, or 
bridewealth: officially-recognized ‘native tribunals’ were supposed to settle disputes, but 
found their decisions undermined or disputed by groups of ‘elders’ who ran alternative  
courts, sometimes in collusion with chiefs.
41
   Sporadic attempts by the colonial state to 
clarify control over ‘customary law’ through a revival of age-set rituals for one or more 
‘Wanyika’ groups – in 1917-19; in 1924; in 1928-9; in 1939 – attracted some enthusiasm, but  
repeatedly  collapsed beneath the weight of the mutual suspicion and personal ambitions of 
older men themselves.
42
 Many individuals might claim to be elders, but in 1944 it was 
reported that ‘the old kambi system has decayed and now hardly exists’. The uncertainty and 
rivalry over the status of elders which has been identified in recent scholarship on the 
Giriama  has a long history.
43
  
For at least some of these older men  the idea of the Mijikenda offered a new way to address 
these problems, deploying the discursive contrast between tradition and modernity to affirm a 
vision of a wider legitimacy which  placed older men at the centre of traditional authority, as 
a new kind of kambi.  The term Mijikenda had first been used in the 1920s,  precisely in this 
context of elder men’s authority: the ‘Midzichenda Native Tribunal’ was created in 1924 to 
handle cases under customary law in nine locations in Kwale district – Midzichenda means, 
literally, ‘nine settlements’.44 
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The availability of the term Mijikenda set off a vigorous round of political entrepreneurship 
and claims-making. In the aftermath of the meeting at Rabai, people claiming to represent the 
Mijikenda Union set to work collecting funds throughout the southern coast, with ‘clerks’ of 
the Union travelling widely: it was reported that 16,481/- had been collected in one-shilling 
subscriptions.
45
 The collection coincided both with another attempt to revive the initiation of 
elders and with reports that ‘elders’ were again subverting official tribunals by trying to settle 
cases.
46
  By mid-1947 the initiations had, like previous attempts, come to nothing as different 
groups of older men argued over the control and cost of the ceremonies.
47
   
Meanwhile, British officials suspected that chiefs were collecting the Mijikenda Union 
subscription as though it were a tax, and that members of the Union were misrepresenting 
themselves as a body which could negotiate with the government (sixty years later, one man 
still believed that the Mijikenda Union ‘had agreed with government, each taxpayer should 
pay 1/-‘).48 Colonial officials elsewhere in Kenya seem to have smiled on ethnic unions at 
this time.
 49
 But on the coast their attitude soon turned to outright hostility. In the Rabai area, 
and a little further inland near Mariakani, ‘development’ schemes which involved cutting 
kaya forests were disrupted by young men claiming to work for the Mijikenda Union;  their 
success was limited, but enough to outrage officials.
50
  
This outrage grew when the Union became involved in land issues. When the rest of the ‘East 
Africa Protectorate’ had become Kenya Colony in 1921, the ‘Ten-Mile Strip’ which ran 
along the coast had remained a protectorate, nominally the sovereign territory of the Omani 
sultan of Zanzibar.
51
  In Kenya Colony, there was no freehold title to land; in the Ten-Mile 
strip, the British recognized what they believed to be pre-existing freehold land rights. In 
practice, only those who were classified as Arabs and Asians were able to secure this 
recognition, and Africans could own neither leasehold nor freehold.
 52
 South of Mombasa, the 
collective claims to land of the Digo were acknowledged through the provision of tribal 
reserves in the coastal strip. North of Mombasa, the coastal strip was composed entirely of 
freeholds in Arab or Asian ownership; leaseholds given more recently to European or Asian 
farmers; and unallocated ‘Crown Land’. Large numbers of people lived on these lands, 
sometimes as formal tenants, paying rent, more often as squatters, giving a share of their 
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crops or their labour to landowners but without any clear legal rights or obligations.
53
 Some 
were former slaves, or their descendants; others were more recent migrants from a little 
further inland. Whatever their parents and grandparents may have called themselves, by the 
1940s, many of these people claimed to belong to one of the groups which came to be called 
Mijikenda. 
While some landowners, short of capital, were happy to have such squatters on their land, the 
squatters had no security of tenure. Disputes over crops, and especially over the ownership of 
planted trees, were always possible. In the 1930s, the wider colonial obsession with erosion 
and soil degradation encouraged British officials to view squatting as a problem – since 
squatters were alleged to use the land in a destructive, short-term way.
54
 The result was a 
prolonged but fitful campaign to evict or at least regulate squatters on private land, and to 
drive them off Crown Land onto ‘settlement schemes’, where tenure and farming practices 
were controlled.
55
  This did not reduce the number of squatters, but it did produce an insecure 
and vulnerable group ready to appropriate the name of the Mijikenda Union in pursuit of their 
claims to land. Officials reacted with predictable irritation: ‘The action of the temporary 
committee of the proposed Mij Kenda Union in writing a letter inciting the Wagiriama to turn 
Arabs off their land makes one regard the Union with suspicion’.56  
The committee of the Mijikenda Union were chastised by officials, but activists continued to 
evoke the name of the Union: ‘A Giriama, stating that he was acting on behalf of the 
Mijikenda Union on the 29
th
 July had a  baraza  [public meeting] . . . at which he asserted 
that all the land in the coastal strip belonged to the African’; men identified as  ‘kaya elders’ 
were alleged to have sent him, though they denied this to the district commissioner.
 57
  
Infuriated by these challenges, the district commissioner organized public meetings ‘at which 
the Agents of the Miji Kenda Union were invited to state to the people to what purpose they 
had put the money which they have been collecting’.58  The next few years saw a prolonged 
wrangle over control of the funds involving British officials and various individuals who 
claimed to be office-holders (denounced by one DC as ‘a bunch of semi-educated stiffs’). 
Several thousand shillings were reportedly embezzled and two men imprisoned; and by 1953 
it was reported that the Mijikenda Union ‘has practically died.’59   While a version of the 
Union survived in Nairobi for a few years among a small – and apparently entirely Christian 
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– group of government employees, running a small general goods shop and  holding regular 
music and dance events, this vanished in the mid-1950s when several key members retired 
and moved back to the coast.
60
 
The term Mijikenda itself maintained a precarious discursive existence in these years; but one 
innovative practice drew Mijikenda identity directly into everyday expressions of the 
imagined contrast between the worlds of urban and rural, of money and of kinship. A 
correspondent to the Mombasa Times in 1955 opined that the term ‘Mijikenda’ was  ‘too 
long, too artificial, and has already failed’;  the only published reaction to this was another 
letter suggesting that the term ‘Wanyika’ was perfectly good.61 An educated Christian Ribe, 
writing an account of ‘his tribe’ for publication, preferred to argue that the nine tribes were 
‘Swahili’, although he somewhat dismissively noted that ‘these days they call themselves 
“Miji Kenda”’.62 But wider memory does record a persistent use of this new ethnonym. For 
an urban worker who imagined themselves as a migrant from the rural area, to die in town 
was a constant risk; to be buried in town was inconceivable. An urban death was always the 
cue for a collection of money to transport the corpse back to a rural home for burial; such 
collections were made through meetings which brought together any available immediate 
family members with a shifting cast of more distant kin,  in-laws and prominent community 
figures, whose attendance, and whose contributions were recorded in a book.  Marriage, 
migration and urban solidarity based on linguistic and cultural similarity would ensure that 
any such collection  meeting brought together individuals from a number of the nine tribes, 
and  the collection itself came to be known in the 1950s simply as ‘the Mijikenda’ or ‘the 
Midzichenda’; and  ‘even today Mijikenda is still collected, it buries, it is not for weddings or 
education,  no, that Mijikenda is given to bury’.63  
The politics of the Ten-Mile Strip 
In the later 1950s the term Mijikenda - and the Mijikenda Union - suddenly reappeared in the 
written record with extraordinary rapidity, driven by the complex and very public politics of 
the final years of colonial rule. As the end of British rule moved swiftly from distant prospect 
to imminent reality, debates over identity acquired urgency and venom: in this context, like 
the term Kalenjin elsewhere in Kenya at the same time, the idea of Mijikenda identity offered 
a resource which many sought to exploit  for it conjured a political constituency, African but 
distinctively coastal, from a bundle of multiple, overlapping  moral ethnicities.
64
 This was an alluring 
prospect for aspiring politicians - but the term was equally potent in the hands of ordinary men and 
women who might use it to make claims on leaders, and to legitimate their demands for land or jobs. 
And the term found its way deeper into daily life. It was deployed in moral arguments over rights and 
relationships with kin, or with neighbours; and it added a new layer to the ritual repertoire of a 
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population which was chronically concerned with the challenges of disease and drought, and about the 
malign possibilities of witchcraft. 
The decision to allow African political organizations at a district level from 1955, followed 
by the creation of directly-elected African representation on Kenya’s Legislative Council 
from 1957, marked the beginning of this period, and the anomaly of the Ten-Mile Strip 
shaped the way the way these politics developed over the years leading up to independence in 
1963, by raising a stark question: when British rule ended, would the Ten-Mile Strip be part 
of an independent Kenya, or would it be ruled by the Sultan of Zanzibar?
65
 And a second, 
subsidiary, question came to be equally insistent. If the Ten-Mile Strip were to be part of 
Kenya, would the coast  be allowed a degree of autonomy, to guard against the danger of 
domination by ‘up-country’ Africans?   
The first of these questions turned coastal residents against one another, as they rehearsed and 
developed ideas of identity which had long been extant, but had been hardened by the 
experience of the sultans’ rule in the late nineteenth century and by British administration. 
Those who defined themselves as Arabs, as descendants of migrants who had come from 
Oman or elsewhere since the seventeenth century, had enjoyed political and economic 
privilege.
66
 Uneasily alongside Arab identity lay the idea of ‘the Swahili’, a usefully 
ambivalent term which  could be used both to assert a relationship to a much more ancient 
immigration from the Middle East and to claim a status as the descendants of coastal 
indigenes, who had intermarried with or assimilated to this immigrant community. Swahili 
identity had given generations of local migrants, forced and unforced, the possibility of  
incorporation into a largely urban, Muslim culture. But it was a possibility rooted in 
inequality, and in an explicitly racial and ethnic (the distinction between the terms is 
impossible to unpick here) hierarchy of domination, the assumptions of which were hardened 
by nineteenth- and twentieth-century experience.
67
  Arabs looked down on Swahili; Swahili 
looked down on those whom they called Wanyika. The use of the term Swahili itself had 
declined under the force of Arab disdain and colonial skepticism; by the 1940s, many Swahili 
preferred to describe themselves in Arabic, as members of the Tissia Taifa (‘nine tribes’) and 
Thalatha Taifa (‘three tribes’).68 For coastal Africans excluded from these Arab, or Arabized, 
identities, the possibility that the coast might actually be ruled by Zanzibar was profoundly 
alarming.
69
 
The second question potentially pitted the people of the coast as a whole against the rest of 
Kenya. In the towns – notably in Mombasa, by far the largest urban centre on the coast – men 
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from all over Kenya competed for waged work for the municipality, for the railway and, most 
of all, on the docks, where the long campaign by state and employers to stabilize labour was 
fought in the context of bitter rivalry over jobs which had persistent ethnic overtones.
70
 
Coastal people feared that ‘up-country’ people with superior school education, and with a 
vigorous involvement in politics in Nairobi, would seize political power - and the best jobs - 
when British rule ended.
71
 This was  a local variant of the fear of domination by people from 
central Kenya which was felt in other parts of Kenya, and was stirred so effectively by 
politicians.
72
 But it was a distinctive variant, for at the coast, all people from ‘up-country’ 
could be resented – not just those from central Kenya - so that coastal politicians who became 
involved in Kenyan national politics always faced local suspicion. 
From 1956, aspirant political leaders  sought to mobilize coastal Africans against aliens.  In 
Mombasa, the Mombasa African District Union (MADU) urged African unity against the 
Arabs; in Kilifi District, north of Mombasa, the Kilifi African People’s Union (KAPU)  
encouraged squatters to appropriate the crops of trees on landowners’ estates, emboldened by 
a sudden boom in cashew nut prices which added a new economic incentive to an old 
grievance.
73
 The documentary record of the period does not show whether the term Mijikenda 
was used in the public meetings which were the central elements of this politics, and  
‘African’ seems to have been the more common term: KAPU’s constitution pledged it to 
‘promote with energy all the rights of the Africans of Kilifi District’.74  
British district commissioners did little to hide their dislike of the leaders of KAPU and 
MADU, who were described as ‘clerks’ working in Mombasa. They were initially more 
enthusiastic  when in 1957, on the basis of a very restricted franchise, Ronald Ngala became 
the African Elected Member of Legislative Council representing the coast.
75
 Ngala was a 
Giriama Christian,  who had in 1949 written a little book on Giriama custom which asserted 
the distinctive history and culture of that group (though it briefly acknowledge that the nine 
tribes ‘have joined together with the name “Mijikenda”’).76 There is no evidence that Ngala 
was involved in the Mijikenda Union in the 1940s, and he did not become active in public life  
in Mombasa until the early 1950s, when he was headmaster of a school and a nominated 
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councillor.
77
  But by 1959 Ngala was using the term Mijikenda to assert the right of squatters 
to  take ownership of land in the coastal strip.
78
  
In the process, Ngala ‘revived’ the Mijikenda Union, as he tried to assert primacy among a 
fractious group of would-be leaders of African coastal politics, who had preceded him in 
involvement in KAPU and MADU.
79
  His initial status as an apparent favourite of the 
government was not necessarily an electoral advantage, and by late 1958 he was holding 
public meetings jointly with KAPU, tacitly vying for prominence with the established leaders 
of that party.
80
 In this contest,  Ngala turned to an explicitly ethnic political base and to the 
assertion of tradition, encouraging the creation in 1957 of the Midzichenda Cooperative 
Society – which, by 1960, had assumed the identity of the Mijikenda Union.81    
There was an immediate practical advantage to this. While political parties were still only 
permitted to operate at a district level, as a ‘welfare’ organization the Mijikenda Union 
allowed Ngala to organize across three districts.
82
 But this was not merely a matter of evading 
colonial law: the Mijikenda Union   was  a different kind of organization to KAPU or 
MADU. While KAPU and similar parties vied for seats in the institutions of government, 
using the term ‘African’ to define their claimed constituency and emphasising development 
in their rhetoric, the Mijikenda Union did not put up candidates for seats – though it was 
vigorously engaged in politics – and its language was that of tradition. It drew its strength 
from men who self-consciously presented themselves as ‘elders’, and who insisted that their 
status rested not on government or education but on their knowledge of the kayas and of 
tradition – though the biographies of these men might seem to confound the distinction 
between tradition and government.  
Among them were a former government chief, Mwachiti Nyawa, who  had been present in 
that role at the meeting in Rabai in 1945. Another, Mwanyanje Vali, had been jailed for 
embezzling Mijikenda Union funds in 1948; a third, Birya Masha, was a member of the 
African District Council, with first-hand experience of local government.
83
 But  they 
presented themselves as elders, and the style and language of this revived Mijikenda Union 
evoked  a very local idea of cultural continuity and primacy which rested on tradition: from 
the late 1950s, Birya Masha routinely cast himself as one of the ‘elders of Kaya  Giriama’, 
(although, symptomatically, some still deny that he ever was a ‘real’ kaya elder) and publicly 
derided those who had abandoned their culture in favour of education: ‘those who prided 
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themselves on being educated had a hard time with Birya . . . he said, you see, these educated 
people, they are all thieves!’84 This vivid discursive evocation of tradition through contrast to 
modernity led the district commissioner to comment on ‘the revival of tradition’ in this 
period;  Ngala took to wearing a beaded cap, given to him by kaya elders, which was widely 
believed to contain a powerful magic charm.
85
 
In late 1961, circumstances provided an opportunity for a very public display of the 
traditional politics of the Mijikenda Union, with the visit to the coast of the commissioner 
appointed to enquire into the future of the ‘Coastal Strip’. By this time Ngala had led a new 
party, the Coast African People’s Union (CAPU) - which was created from KAPU as the 
restrictions on party organizations  were lifted -  into a wider national party, the Kenya 
African Democratic Union (KADU). This brought together a group of politicians who sought 
national independence but feared – or claimed that ‘their people’ feared – Kikuyu 
dominance.
86
 KADU organized delegations and memoranda opposing separate independence 
for the coast.  But it was people claiming association with the Mijikenda Union who put on 
the most dramatic display, organizing a boycott of Arab shops, and bringing hundreds of 
men, ‘dressed in Mijikenda style’ and armed with bows and spears, onto the streets of 
Mombasa to stage a mock ‘funeral’ for  the idea of an independent coast.87 When the 
commissioner travelled south of Mombasa he was mobbed by cheering crowds chanting 
‘Freedom with Mijikenda.’88 Petitions and memoranda used the term Mijikenda to express a 
claim to autochthony. Ngala himself set the tone: ‘KADU does not recognize the coastal strip 
agreement of 1895 we demand immediate abrogation and sovereignty of the whole Coast 
province reverting to indigenous be [sic] native ie Wamidzichenda’; and ‘the strip is African 
soil . . . the Arabs know very how they first came into contact with Mijikenda as the 
indigenous owners of the strip’. 89 Appearing at a rally in Mombasa, in ‘Miji Kenda robes 
presented to him . . . as a sign of “eldership”’, Ngala wove together autochthony, tradition 
and Mijikenda primacy: ‘”The whole of the Coast Province . . . was occupied by the Miji 
Kenda. It was their country – even before the Arab immigation”’.90 
Others similarly  intertwined the claim to autochthony with an  emphasis on traditional 
authority. ‘The WAMIJIKENDA are the indigenous owners [of the coast] . . . The kayas have 
always been the traditional bodies  charged with the task of maintaining law and order.’  The 
number and style of memoranda sent to the commissioner - allegedly from groups of rural 
elders who were almost certainly illiterate, but typed up in English or Swahili and sent in the 
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space of a few days in October - suggest a coordinated attempt to link being indigenous with 
being Mijikenda. So too did the language of the many delegations who made verbal 
submissions: ‘the indigenes who are original in this country, who are the Mijikenda; ’ ‘we the 
people of Mijikenda . . . do not want foreign rule’.91 Some of them expressed also the view 
that they ‘did not want to be ruled by an up-country government .’92  To emphasise the point, 
Ngala’s close ally, Robert Matano  - described as the ‘leader of the Mijikenda Union’ - took a 
delegation of ‘Mijikenda elders’ to Zanzibar to challenge the sultan.93 
At the end of 1961, the commissioner  recommended that the coastal strip should become part 
of Kenya. Political debate rapidly shifted to the terms of that inclusion. Even as the 
commissioner had gathered evidence, KADU had been developing the idea of a ‘regional’ 
constitution under which an independent Kenya would see significant powers devolved from 
the centre; KANU was reluctantly forced to agree to this plan, and in 1962 two further 
commissions visited the coast to delimit electoral constituencies and to set the boundaries of 
the proposed regions.
94
 In May 1963, elections gave KADU local victory at the coast - where 
they dominated the regional assembly – but national defeat at the hands of KANU. Over the 
next seventeen months, as Kenya moved towards complete independence, KANU steadily 
chipped away at the regional constitution and at the fragile unity of KADU.
95
 Finally, in 
October 1964, KADU dissolved; Ngala joined KANU, and formally abandoned the aim of a 
distinct status for the coast, ending  an extraordinarily intense period of very public politics. 
Throughout these dramatic events, the Mijikenda Union continued to hold public meetings – 
sometimes more frequently than KADU did - though it is KADU and KANU who dominate 
the written record.
96
And the language of the Union continued to foreground tradition: the 
press announcement of its annual meeting announced that ‘The meeting will be attended by 
Miji-Kenda elders resident in Mombasa and the Kwale and Kilifi Districts’.97 Local activists 
now used Mijikenda identity to assert their rights against up-country Africans: ‘We Miji 
Kenda  . . . do not want any other tribe to mix with us except the ones which we know to be 
original’; Birya Masha publicly endorsed KADU candidates on behalf of the ‘elders’, and 
candidates were also brought to Kaya Fungo to be blessed.
98
 The politics of independence 
had  firmly established  Mijikenda in the imagination of government - following the flurry of 
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activity around the Coastal Strip, Mijikenda was added to the ‘list of tribal names’ used in the 
1962 census.
99
  But more importantly, this vivid and very public politics had embedded the 
term – and the idea of a collective Mijikenda identity – in wider popular discussions and 
quotidian practice. In 1962 and 1963, men claiming to represent the Mijikenda Union were 
involved in issues of pressing popular concern which were quite unrelated to national politics 
-the control of witchcraft, and the performance of rituals intended to ensure that rain fell – as 
well as in continuing disputes over squatting and cashew trees.
100
  
The people’s government? 
Independent Kenya was on one level a developmentalist state, whose  formal institutions, 
language and practice  were all alien forms, inherited from its late colonial forebear,  and in 
which  rhetoric linked state legitimacy to a familiar bundle of ‘progress’ – education, 
healthcare, roads, waged work. But delivery of that bundle was at best erratic, and the state 
could never reward all of its citizens equally with the fruits of independence; and so 
politicians were required to manage a local politics of patronage, ‘to deliver the support of 
their ethnically mobilised constituents and clients’.101 While the formal structures of the state 
were alien, this local politics turned much more readily to a distinctive language of tradition, 
and to the sometimes novel ethnic constituencies which this defined.
102
  
The foci of political activity shifted abruptly after 1964. In the words of one official: ‘[t]he 
role of politicians changed to that of Nation-Building. Instead of holding political meetings 
many Development barazas [public meetings] were held.’103 Through such meetings, 
addressed by district commissioners, and sometimes by local members of parliament ‘appeals 
[were] made to the public to provide better sanitation and adopt better methods of living’ and 
‘emphasis . . . put on education, farming and self-help projects’.104 These meetings were held 
at district headquarters on national holidays, and elsewhere as part of tours or official visits 
by ministers: as when Ngala and Matano, now KANU stalwarts and government ministers,  
addressed a KANU rally in 1971 and urged their listeners ‘to mount joint efforts in the field 
of development endeavour’, or when Kenyatta gave a speech in Malindi ‘laying emphasis on 
hard work and change of attitude by the coastal people'.
105
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The written record of these events may suggest a sullen populace being harangued to ‘work 
harder on your farms’ by an authoritarian state.106 But as Angelique Haugerud has argued,  
while only one party was allowed to organize, and the state could be heavy-handed, 
politicians and administrators feared the humiliation which a scanty, silent, or even restive  
crowd could visit on a speaker; the state needed politicians who could show their popularity, 
and meetings could be unpredictable.
107
 And so a partly hidden local politics ran alongside,   
and sometimes through, these meetings:  politics given a particular edge at the coast since 
most senior administrators were from up-country, but all politicians were locals, who were 
expected to secure the support of ‘their’ people – these were encounters between government 
and local community, in which ideas of ethnicity and tradition were evoked to distance the 
government and to argue over who had the support of the community. Speeches were not 
always confined to bland exhortations to development; they could include pointed comments 
about rivals, or appeals to visiting dignitaries: ‘indirect messages float between orators and 
hearers’, as Haugerud observed. And alongside the public events there were private meetings 
with individuals or delegations, who sought the patronage of politicians to secure anything 
from school fees for a child to government finance for a clinic. Politicians in their turn sought 
out individuals or groups who they thought would help them secure victory for themselves or 
their allies in local government elections, and in parliamentary by-elections or national 
elections (held in 1969 and 1974); and who they believed would help turn out an appreciative 
crowd for meetings.  
In this politics, both Ngala and Matano – who remained nominal ‘president’ of the Mijikenda 
Union until its dissolution-  used the idea of the Mijikenda as a collective group , rooted in 
tradition, whose loyalty they undertook to secure in return for the guarantee of resources. 
They  evoked this idea to negotiate upwards, as they vied with other ministers for jobs and 
projects; and downwards, as they argued to ‘their people’ that they were serving their 
interests. Both men were nervous of rivals – and of each other -  colluding to prevent the 
emergence of other possible leaders.
108
 And crucially, both talked and behaved in ways which 
affirmed a distinction between the ‘government’, and a sphere of local legitimacy and 
authority which rested on tradition and was embodied in Mijikenda identity. For Ngala, now 
uneasily in government, the  relationship with ‘elders’ was central to his claim to 
intermediacy with the world of tradition: ‘when Ronald Ngala went to look for votes . . . 
Birya Masha had to be there’.109  
For Matano too, the Mijikenda Union offered a formal way to position himself as the 
interlocutor between government and tradition. But he struggled to do so. Matano was 
usually described as Duruma; but local knowledge was and is always ready to recategorise 
him, as his paternal grandfather and maternal grandmother are both said to have been former 
slaves, brought by missionaries to their home  on Methodist church land near Mazeras.
110
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the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of KADU – which came as a severe shock to 
many people at the coast – Matano’s claims to intermediacy were under attach.111 Within a 
month the elders of the Mijikenda Union, including some of the men who had been on the 
delegation to Zanzibar,  were sending a pointed message to Matano: ‘You, our representative, 
Mr Matano, we see that you are now very busy, now that you are in the Government and have 
become a minister’, they declared, announcing that a meeting had elected Birya Masha to be 
‘President’ in his place.112  Matano ignored this, but Birya Masha and his fellow elders kept 
up a steady campaign in which they consistently referred to their status as kaya elders as 
justification for their claim to authority over the Mijikenda, and announced that Matano had 
been toppled as 
 it appears that the many concerns of  government have meant that he does not have 
the time or ability to lead the Mijikenda Union , which is a party that makes every 
child of Kenya remember their traditions . . . so that the beliefs of our grandfathers 
and fathers should not be lost .
113
  
These typewritten letters, and the titles they used, drew deeply on bureaucratic practice while 
insisting on the authorizing power of tradition. Birya Masha, they declared, had been 
‘elected’ as president of the Mijikenda Union, and so  ‘we have given him complete authority 
over the traditions of the Mijikenda’; the authors described themselves as ‘chairmen’, and 
sometimes as ‘presidents’ of the kayas; in one letter they personified themselves as kayas.114 
David Parkin, conducting anthropological research in these years, encountered what local 
discourse cast as the ‘people’s government’, a practice of dispute resolution based on elder 
men’s authority.115  Such local ‘courts’ were by no means novel, but the idea that they dealt 
in ‘Mijikenda’ custom was; Birya and his fellows were inserting themselves and the 
Mijikenda Union into popular notions of customary justice, drawing on their own role at 
intermediaries:  
[Birya’s] work was to go to Kizurini[the office of the district officer] and when he 
came back from there he went to the kaya . . . all the time he talked of the DO, DC, 
PC and he had letters in his pockets; he could not read but he knew that this [pocket] 
was for the DC; this one for the DO’.116   
Parkin may have overstated the institutional strength of the Union at this time, but  Birya was 
successful enough to alarm local administrators, one of whom reported that Birya was 
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‘engaging in political agitation, holding of unlawful courts and illegal secret collection of 
money’.117 
Administrators’ suspicions of Birya were exacerbated by concerns over witchcraft. The point 
at which esoteric individual knowledge and power over well-being turned baleful was 
uncertain, and so witchcraft was a perennial concern in local communities. The services of 
‘witchfinders’ – individuals who claimed to be able to identify witches, but were themselves 
often suspected of witchcraft - were prized,  despite the disapproving attitude of colonial and 
post-colonial officials, who saw them as charlatans who endangered public order. Sometimes 
these officials simply banned witch-finding– in Kwale in 1965, for example.118 But Parkin’s 
work has shown how government and Mijikenda Union became entangled in a dispute over 
how to manage witchcraft in 1966, when a new witch finder called Tsuma Washe – better 
known as Kajiwe – emerged. One local administrator disdainfully noted that ‘[s]urprisingly, 
this Witch Finder has a large crowd of followers’; others sought to enlist the traditional 
authority of the Mijikenda Union to manage him. The failure of this led to Kajiwe’s 
imprisonment, and a deepening of administrative hostility to the Mijikenda Union, as Birya 
Masha and his fellows made increasingly strident claims to an authority based on tradition, 
and beyond the control of the state.
 119
   ‘The ritual of the traditional oath of the Mijikenda’, 
they insisted, could end witchcraft; the Mijikenda Union had authorised ‘indigenous ritual 
experts’ who would eradicate witchcraft if only the government would allow them to do 
so.
120
  Birya and his allies offered the idea of a Mijikenda collective ritual identity as the 
answer to other problems, too:  as when urban workers in Mombasa raised funds for Birya to 
use in a collective ‘Mijikenda’ ritual to bring rain.121 
Birya and his allies used the Mijikenda Union to raise another chronic  concern of a populace 
who suspected that their political leaders had abandoned them to join ‘the government’. 
Independence had brought no resolution of the land conflicts at the coast: ‘until now you will 
find that the coast is full of squatters, you were born here, your grandfather, the grandfather 
of your grandfather . . .but you’re told that you are a squatter’.122 From 1964, these squatters 
increasingly faced African landowners – some from up-country, a few of them coastal 
members of the new political elite -  who were buying up government land, or estates which 
had belonged to Europeans or Arabs. Ngala and Matano were too cautious to speak out 
publicly against this, but Birya Masha roundly denounced the eviction of squatters in the 
name of the Mijikenda Union.
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Matano fought back, insisting that he controlled the Mijikenda Union and ordering local 
administrators to prevent Birya and his allies from holding meetings.
 124
 After Ngala’s death 
in a car crash in 1972, Matano rushed to convene a meeting which confirmed his presidency 
of the Mijikenda Union – seeking thus to ensure his own status as a political leader. 125 But 
through the rest of the 1970s, the Union’s significance remained imaginary, rather than 
institutional – torn between multiple claimants to the role of intermediary, its name constantly 
evoked, it had no sustained organizational existence.  
Conclusion 
The dissolution of the Mijikenda Union in 1980 had little meaning; there was no institution to 
abolish. But the idea of a Mijikenda identity had become embedded in multiple areas of 
discourse and practice. It was evoked by politicians to define a constituency; by elders who 
sought to create a moral community over which they had influence; but also  by urban 
workers who saw the Union either as a  tool for political mobilization in their complex battles 
over civic office in Mombasa, or as a means to assert their continued commitment to a rural 
moral community through a collective offering for rain; and again by squatters who offered it 
as legitimation of their claims to land. For all these different actors,  the idea of a Mijikenda 
identity offered a way to claim intermediacy between tradition and modernity,  asserting the 
central importance of a categorical distinction which was both imaginary and powerful. This 
super-tribe was not the creation of colonial officials, or missionaries, and it drew much of its 
creative and dynamic force from continuity: it did not entirely remake culture, or people’s 
sense of themselves. In this, it reveals the ‘limits of invention’. But it was also a ‘modern 
product of the African encounter with capitalism and the nation state’.126  The processes 
involved could be dramatic, as they were in the debates over the Ten-Mile Strip in October 
1961; more often they were incremental. But the idea of the Mijikenda grew out of colonial 
and post-colonial experience. Consistently, and innovatively, those who experimented with it 
built on the powerfully productive set of contrasts which set modernity against tradition. 
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